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Questions concerning the extent to
which privacy should be governed
and what the rules should be.
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P particularly
rivacy is a loose
collection
of principles,
including
a property
right in
information and an interest in a protected
personal sphere. 1 In general, there are
questions concerning the extent to which
privacy should be governed by default or
by mandatory rules, and what these default
or mandatory rules should be.
Privacy raises particularly difficult and
important questions in the employment
context. Employees and employers have
competing interests in disclosing and
preventing disclosure of information. For
example, firms may want to share
information with their employees about
customers, trade practices and technology
that helps the employees do their jobs. This
raises the concern that employees will reap
private advantage by selling or otherwise
transferring this information to third parties
during or following their employment. This
concern could reduce firms' willingness to
share such information with employees,
and can suppress incentives to develop
information or inventions. 2 At the same
time, excessive protection of the employers'
information could reduce employees'
mobility and the flow of valuable
information in society.
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wealth by encouraging efficient
employment relationships. This requires
sensitivity to the unique characteristics of
the economic activity that gives rise to the
specific organizational form chosen by a
given firm. It follows that balancing may
best be achieved by enforcing firms'
contracts. Contracts covering employment
issues in general, and privacy in
employment in particular, are among the
nexus of contracts that are the central
characteristic of a firm. 3 Since efficient
restrictions add value to the firm by
protecting its proprietary information and
ability to monitor employees, employers
and employees usually are better off if
contracts are enforced than if they are not,
To be sure, employees may prefer expost
not to be bound by restrictions on
disclosure and not to be monitored by the
employer. But employees are better off ex
anteto the extent that they share in the
value of efficient arrangements through
higher compensation.
That is not to say that enforcing contracts
is always efficient. There may be some role
in this area as in other areas of intra-firm
contracting for legal regulation. For
example, restrictions on the dissemination
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Employers, in turn, need information
about employees in order to evaluate them
for hiring and to monitor them while they
are employed. Employees have an
incentive to disclose because employers'
information costs affect the cost of
employment and ultimately jobs and
compensation. But employees also may
have an interest in keeping some
information private to protect their personal
space or to hide shirking or other bad acts
that are detrimental to the firm.
Appropriately balancing employers',
employees' and society's interests in
workplace privacy contributes to social

of employer information or on employee
mobility may benefit both employees and
employers but reduce social wealth
because of their negative effects on
development of intellectual property and
competition. Employers' intrusions into
employee privacy may be privately wealth
maximizing within the firm, but have social
costs in terms of the loss of individuality.
Thus, it may be tempting to regulate these
contracts.
But in order to fully evaluate such
regulation, it is important to measure costs
as well as benefits. The full costs of
regulating employer/employee contracts
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appear only from an understanding of the role these
contracts play in the overall operation of the firm, and an
appreciation of the second-best alternatives parties would
resort to if regulation precludes first-best contracts. For
example, restricting protection of employer information
can inhibit firms from disseminating confidential business
information to employees 4 and, in turn, force revision of
relationships with employees. Protecting the privacy of
employees' information can inhibit monitoring of
employees and force employers to resort to non-agencytype relationships.
This paper is both normative and positive. It shows
why contracts regarding these issues shouldbe enforced.
it also shows that the contracts are enforced despite
seemingly mandatory state rules preventing enforcement.
The key to understanding the positive analysis is to see
the enforcement issue in the interstatecontext, where
both employers and employees are free to choose the
states in which they live, contract, and sue.
Part I presents an overview of the theory of the firm
and its implications for privacy. Part 1I discusses the
issues regarding privacy of the employers' information,
including enforcement of contracts between employers
and employees from intra- and interstate perspectives.
Part III discusses privacy issues concerning employees,
again including enforcement of contracts.

I. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND PRIVACY

E conomic activity is carried out within a firm when the

5

costs of using market transactions are relatively high.
Within a firm, a nexus of longer-term contracts that direct
activity and restrain the behavior of the transactors
replaces spot transactions directed by market prices. 6 The
form of these contracts is shaped by the nature of the
transactions and information costs the parties face, One
circumstance in which the cost of using market
transactions is high is team production. Team production
occurs when individual resources are combined so that
the value of the combined output exceeds the sum of the
outputs of the individual resources, and it is costly to
determine an individual's marginal contribution to team
output. 7 Increasing the cost of monitoring an individual's
effort level increases moral hazard costs, ceteris paribus.
Moreover, if the team resources become specialized to
the team, individual members can opportunistically "hold
up" the team by threatening to withdraw team resources
under their control unless they receive a larger share of
the team's marginal product."
The use and production of confidential business

information is an example of the team production
problem. Team production is present because the value
of information produced by many individuals exceeds
the sum of the values of each individual's separate
information. Moreover, the value of the combined
information is often maximized when it is then widely
disseminated among members of the team, as opposed to
being closely held by management. Thus, to maximize
the value of team production, individuals must be
induced to disclose their valuable private information to
the firm, and the firm in turn must be able freely to
disseminate the information among team members,
The inherent attributes of information can, however,
make both types of disclosures costly. First, it is difficult
to monitor individuals' use of the team's information
because information is intangible, thereby facilitating
hidden behavior, 9 and plastic in the sense that it can be
used in many different ways. This deters sharing of
valuable information and reduces the value of team
production. 1 Individuals may fail to disclose valuable
information to the team, inadequately safeguard valuable
information, or use disclosed information for their own
benefit at the team's expense, 12 by direct or indirect
13
disclosure to competitors.
Second, it is difficult to design mechanisms for
encouraging disclosure by individual team members,
Prior to disclosure, the discloser may be unable to
convince others of its value. Indeed, even after
disclosure it may be difficult to value the marginal
contribution of an individual's information.' 4 If the
owner of the information has been unable to strike a
bargain prior to disclosure, it may lose the value of the
information on disclosing it because, absent legal
protection, the potential buyer or others may disseminate
it. 15 These problems may lead to "adverse selection" in
the sense that team members are induced to disclose only
low quality information. 16 A team member also may be
able to use his private information to hurt the team, or
threaten to do so unless he is given a larger share of the
benefits the team creates.
The firm must devise ways to solve these problems of
moral hazard and opportunism associated with the
disclosure and use of information by individuals in the
firm. This includes restricting individuals' access to
valuable information, and developing incentives to create
information. The firm can promulgate rules apportioning
the value of the firm's information among team members,
contract with employees to restrict their behavior during
and after their employment, and monitor employees'

"...firms' incentives to share information with their employees
may be affected by the risk that employees will disclose this
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creation and use of information. These rules and
contracts may involve intrusions into the employee's
"privacy" and restrictions on the employee's "freedom."
But such "intrusions" are no more onerous than terms
contained in licensing agreements that serve to restrict
the "freedom" of the licensee.' 7 Both types of restrictions
facilitate the voluntary production and dissemination of
information.
How a firm addresses these problems depends on
several factors. First, firms differ in the extent to which
their activities use resources and information that are
costly to monitor and expose the firm to opportunistic
behavior. Second, employees vary in their costs of
reduced privacy and ability to move to other jobs. These
differences can be expected to produce many different
approaches to protecting information.
Firms' contracts also depend on legal rules precluding
enforcement of some types of contractual restrictions. For
example, rules that protect employees' privacy can
increase firms' monitoring costs by precluding them from
using some types of intrusive surveillance techniques.
Firms then will have to use less preferred methods of
reducing the costs of employee moral hazard. Firms may
not only switch to less intrusive and effective monitoring
methods, but also make more fundamental changes in
the way they conduct their business. For example, firms'
increased exposure to tort and criminal liability resulting
from diminished ability to effectively monitor employees
may induce firms to replace employees with independent
contractors, thereby effectively altering the scope of the
firm.18 Also, reducing firms' abilities to protect their
information also may reduce dissemination of
information with the firm and potential marginal benefits
of team production.
The desirability of legal rules prohibiting enforcement
of agreements that restrict employee privacy and mobility
must consider several issues in addition to the substantive
nature of such rules, including whether such rules should
be mandatory or default rules, what legal regime will
apply to a contract between a firm and its employees, and
how such rules should be made. For example, if a wide
variety of approaches would be optimal, default rules
may be superior to mandatory rules, and different types
of firms may need different default rules. Under these
circumstances, a decentralized, bottom-up approach to
legal restrictions may be preferred to a top-down,
centralized uniform approach. 19 Finally, while different
firms may prefer a wide variety of approaches, a given
firm may prefer that a particular rule apply uniformly to
all members of a firm. Otherwise, forum shopping by
mobile employees of multi-state or multi-jurisdictional
firms can result in the non-uniform and non-optimal
application of rules regulating the employer/employee
relationship. 20 This suggests that parties should be able to
enter into enforceable contracts by choosing which law
2
governs the employee/employer relationship. 1

II. PROTECTING EMPLOYERS' INFORMATION

This Part builds on the general discussion in Part I by

discussing more specifically the employment
contracts that protect dissemination of employer
information and the costs and benefits of enforcing these
contracts. It shows that, while enforcing these contracts
usually is efficient, there may be some justification for
state laws restricting enforceability. However, the politics
of such laws suggests that state regulation may be
excessive, In particular, states may internalize the
benefits of using these laws to protect local interests
while imposing costs out of state. This Part also shows
that this problem ultimately can be disciplined by the
parties' ability to locate and litigate in jurisdictions that
enforce efficient contracts. Subpart A discusses the
countervailing considerations that drive contracts in this
area. Subpart B discusses state provisions and
enforcement of contracts regarding these issues,
including the default rule protecting trade secrets and
customized contracts regarding ex-employees'
competition and disclosure. It shows that, viewing the
issues solely from an intrastate perspective, states have
perverse incentives not to enforce efficient contracts.
Finally, subpart C discusses the interstate dynamic that
disciplines state law inefficiency.

A. THE BASIC PROBLEM
As discussed in Part I, firms' incentives to share
information with their employees may be affected by
the risk that employees will disclose this information with
others. Employees may do so by either straight sale or by
effective sale in the form of employment. During
employment, the firm can monitor employees' misuse of
information, subject to restrictions on such monitoring
resulting from privacy considerations discussed in the
next Part. The employer's biggest problem, therefore,
may be the employee's use of the information to compete
with her former employer after leaving employment.
From the standpoint of the employer's and employee's
joint welfare, the optimal contractual restrictions depend
on the risk to the employer associated with the
employer's disclosure of proprietary information; the
value to the employer of disseminating the information to
the employee compared to alternative relationships in
which information is not shared with the agent, and the
costs to the employee of being restricted from sharing
information that the employee may have helped create
and that is inherent in the employee's expertise. For
example, the employer may have developed customer
lists or technical information that the employee must have
in order to be able to sell or develop the product.
However, if dissemination of the information to the
employee is likely to lead to the further disclosure of the
information to competitors, sharing this information will
result in a significant reduction in the value of the
employer's valuable informational property right. The
employer's only alternative to restricting disclosure may
be a less productive relationship with the employee.
However, the employee may have also contributed to the
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development of the employer's
products and its clientele. Also, a
highly specialized employee may be
unable to separate her own expertise
from that of the employer. Variations
on these facts would produce
different levels of optimal restrictions
on information in particular
relationships.
The policy analysis is complicated
by social costs of contracts regarding
dissemination of employer
information. Dissemination of
information may be valuable to the
amount of innovation. 22 Conversely,
inability to protect proprietary
information may reduce incentives to
produce it in the first place. 23 Thus,
default roles and contract
enforcement matter.
BRENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS.
INTRASTATE PERSPECTIVE

T

his subpart discusses the basic

law of enforcing contracts that
protect employers' information. It
assumes that the relevant law is that
provided by a single state. Subpart C
widens the perspective to the multistate scenario.
1. The default rule: Trade

secrets law
Trade secrets law most directly
protects the employer's business
information. However, this law has
important gaps, and may be costly
and uncertain to apply. 24 Thus,
employers must supplement default
legal protection of trade secrets by
actively monitoring employees' theft
of information and with other
contractual protection, including
non-competes, as discussed in the
next subsection.

2. Express contractual
protection: Non-compete covenants
Although employees may become
involved in industrial espionage and
outright theft, while they are with the
firm it would seem that the threat of
dismissal would deter most direct
25
misuse of corporate information.
However, after the employee leaves,
firing the employee obviously is no
longer a viable sanction for misuse of
information and the employee has
much stronger incentives to abuse
corporate information. The
5301 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

employee might sell the information
outright, but more often is likely to
try to use the information as leverage
in getting another job or as the basis
for a competing business. As noted
above, relying on trade secret law
alone may not be an effective means
to prevent such abuse of employer
information. Thus, the most
important protection in this setting is
through the use of covenants not to
compete. 26 These contracts impede
employees from effectively selling
the information by pursuing lines of
work after employment where the
information is most valuable. The
agreements also serve several other
functions, including ensuring the
retention of unique talent, and
protecting the firm's investment in
27
training employees.
Covenants not to conmpete are not
always enforced under state law, The
main question regarding
enforcement concerns the scope of
the restriction. Most states enforce
"reasonable" restrictions,2 8 although
they may differ on standards of
reasonableness. Some states have
strong statutoy policies against
enforcement set forth in statutes. In
particular, the California statute
provides, "every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent
void."29

The states appear to have several
reasons for not enforcing these
agreements. First, where the
agreement restricts the employee
more than appears necessary to
protect the employer's property
rights, the agreement may be anticompetitive - that is, it may prevent
employees with valuable expertise
from working for competitors. Also,
employers may try to piggyback
competition restrictions onto
protection of information by
disclosing more trade secrets to
employees than the job requires in
order to justify broad restrictions. 30
Second, some courts appear to be
concerned with inequality of
bargaining power between employer
and employee, perhaps attributable
to employees' lack of market power
or sophistication. Third, Ronald
Gilson has argued that enforcing

non-competes reduces positive
externalities of information sharing
between firms that can permit the
31
growth of high-tech corridors.
These arguments may or may not
justify non-enforcement.32 In
general, even if non-compete
agreements have costs, it is important
to consider whether the benefits of
enforcement discussed above
outweigh the costs. Even if the court
imposes a seemingly mild
"reasonableness" restriction, it may
be hard for employers to design a
restriction that is both broad enough
to protect their information and
narrow enough to satisfy the courts.
Thus, holding agreements
unenforceable may impede
protection of employers' information.
This seems particularly clear where
alleged costs are internalized
between the employer and
employee.
With respect to the argument that
the agreements are anticompetitive, it
is not clear why employers in general
should be deemed to have enough
market power in the employment
market to render their employment
agreements suspect. Just as
employers compete for valuable
employees at the time of
employment, so they must compete
as to the terms of employment,
including terms that restrict
employees' mobility. Thus,
employers would internalize the
costs of these agreements through
the wages they must pa- employees
to agree to the covenants. Indeed, it
would seem that employers would
have to pay employees more than
the agreements are worth as
restrictions on competition since
employees, whose human capital is
not diversifiable, could be expected
to be averse to the risks of
immobility.
Perhaps the competition argument
reduces to an argument that the
employers have unfair bargaining
leverage over employees. But again,
it is not clear why this would be the
case throughout the employment
market. Moreover, covenants not to
compete are most prevalent with
respect to the most highly trained
workers and professionals, who are
presumably most able to protect

themselves contractually. Although
legal restrictions on non-competes
may make workers better off than
they would be without the
restrictions, it is not clear whether
this is efficient or in any sense fair.
Non-enforcement of the covenants
may transfer wealth from employers
and low human capital workers to
high human capital workers. 33 Even
if employers do have bargaining
leverage, restrictions on noncompetes may accomplish little,
since employers can use their
leverage to reduce the employees'
compensation to adjust for the
inability to impose a non-compete, or
substitute other devices that may be
inferior from the employers'
standpoint but hurt employees as
much or more than non-competes.
For example, employers have the
option of simply disclosing less
information to employees.
With respect to Gilson's argument
that non-competition agreements
may impose social costs by impeding
the flow of information, it is not clear
when this benefit of restrictions is
outweighed by the social costs of
reducing incentives to produce
information or making employment
relationships less efficient. All of this
is not to say that restrictions on noncompetition agreements are never
efficient. The benefits of certain
types of restrictions certainly
outweigh the costs for some types of
economic activities. But the opposite
will be true for other types of
economic activities. Even if
legislation or common law rules that
restrict enforcement of noncompetition agreements enforce
efficient norms or practices for the
former subset of activities, 34 applying
such laws to the latter set of activities
will be socially costly. Thus, there is
room for experimentation with and
competition among various regimes.
This raises the question, discussed in
the next subpart, whether
jurisdictional choice leads to
efficient rules.

C. THE INTERSTATE
PERSPECTIVE
ilson suggests that states should

enforcement of non-competes
because employers can leave states
that inadequately enforce contracts
and protect property rights. 35 But a
state's regulation may apply to
employers who have offices in
multiple states, that seek to recruit in
the regulating state, or whose
employees are being recruited by an
employer in the regulating state. The
national or international scope of
many modern firms makes it costly
for them to structure their businesses
so that they avoid operation in states
with undesirable rules, This may
enable states - particularly a large,
economically powerful state like
California - to impose the costs of
its competition policy on firms
elsewhere while local firms get the
benefits. Conversely, California's
firms are subject to the costs of other
states' inadequate regulation while
they must play by local rules in doing
business locally, This problem of
"spillover" of regulatory costs
suggests that state competition may
lead to inefficient results.
Firms' practical inability to avoid
undesirable state regulation is partly
attributable to default choice-of-law
rules regarding enforcement of
contracts that make it difficult for
employers to predict whether their
agreements will be enforceable in
these interstate situations.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
indicates the range of considerations
courts may take into account:
(1) The rights and duties of the
parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the
local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under
the principles stated in 5 6.
(2) In the absence of an
effective choice of law by the
parties (see § 187), the contacts to
be taken into account in
applying the principles of 5 6 to
determine the law applicable to
an issue include:

G

(a) the place of contracting,

be able to decide what policy
they will follow regarding

(b) the place of negotiation of
the contract,

(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject
matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of
incorporation and place of
business of the parties. These
contacts are to be evaluated
according to their relative
importance with respect to the
particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating
the contract and the place of
performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state
will usually be applied, except as
otherwise provided in % 189-199
and 203.36 The general factors
that guide choice of law under this
section are:
(a) the needs of the interstate
and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the
forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the
determination of the particular
issue,
(d) the protection of justified
expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying
the particular field-of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination
and application of the law to be
37
applied.
Thus, for example, a court might
apply the law of the raiding
employer's state rather than that of
the employee's or employer's state,
even if the employee originally
resided there, because of the raiding
state's strong policy favoring sharing
information. The regulating state
might be able to have it both ways,
since in the reverse situation its own
interest in protecting local
continued onpage 555
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interest than the chosen state in
the determination of the
particular issue and which, under
the rule of 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of
9
law by the parties.3

Bruce Kobayashi is Professor of
Law, George Mason University
School of Law.
Professor Kobayashi received his
Ph.D in economics from the
University of California, Los
Angeles. He is the author of
numerous articles on the law and
economics of intellectual property,
antitrust, regulation, litigation, and
procedure. Ile and Professor
Ribstein have published numerous
articles on jurisdictional
competition and regulation,
including recent articles on state
regulation of consumer marketing
information and state regulation of
electronic commerce.
continued frompage 531
employers' infornation may override
the interests of a state that has no
policy favoring sharing
infornation. 3 1
A potential solution to all these
problems is allowing the parties to
nail down the applicable state law by
including a choice-of-law clause in
their employment contracts. 'tbis can
potentially ensure enforcement of the
clause against application of statc law
that protects employees or raiding
employcis. The Restatement
provides that the law designated in the
contract is not enforced as to a
regulatory issue if:
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or

Since the chosen state isoften the
employer's headquarters or at least a
branch office, the main issues
concern, not the relationship with the
chosen state,"O but whether another
state has a fundamental policy against
enforcement and that state's interests
outweigh the chosen state. The cases
reach varied results, but a review of 67
restrictive covenant cases involving
choice-of-law clauses shows that
clauses were enforced in 39 cases, not
enforced in 25 cases, and inteipreted
as inapplicable in three cases. To be
sure, further analysis is necessary to
determine the marginal effect of the
clause -that is, whether the court
would have reached the same result
under either law. But the courts'
tendency to enforce contractual choice
suggests that the clauses may have
some effect in inducing courts to
enforce
restrictive covenants.
This brief review of the law
suggests that the parties gain
something from these choice-of-law
clauses, even if they are frequently not
enforced. Where the law of a
contractually selected state is fairly
similar to that of another state x lose
law would apply in the absence of
contractual choice,but where the law
of the two states might go either way
with close facts, the court likely will
apply the selected law. Thus,a firm
may be able to gain predictability by
contracting for the application of the
law of a state that has experience with
these clauses or has enforced the
particular clause or clauses in
relevant industries.4' Also, even if the
two potentially applicable laws differ
significantly, a court may choose to
apply the less regulatory statute where
the fact situation is arguably not
covered by the more regulatory
42

(b) application of the law of the
chosen state would he contraiy to
a fundamental policy of a state
which has a materially greater

statute.

How evxer, these clauses do not give
employers perfect protection. The
problem is that states ciforce their

own "fundamental" policies, while at
the sane tinxe refusing to apply tihe
laws of states that have weak
contacts with the contract. This often
means protecting local employers
against employers based out of state.
Consider, for example, Application
Group, Inc, v. Hunter Group, Inc.,43 in
which a California state court
protected a local employcr raiding an
employee of a Maryland firm despite a
Maryland choice of law clause.
Applying the Restatement 44, the court
held that California's anti-noncompete policy applies to
employment involving performance of
'services for California-based
customers" even if the employee had
no prior contact with California and
does not reside in California. The court
reasoned:
In this day and age-with the
advent of computer technology
and the concomitant ability of
many types of employees in many
industries to work from their
homes, or to 'teleconmmute' to
work from anywhere a telephone
link reaches-an emlployce need
not reside in the same city,
county, or state in which the
employer
can be
said to
physically
reside.
California
employers in such sectors of the
economy have a strong and
legitimate interest in having broad
freedom to choose from a much
larger, indeed
a
'national,'
applicant pool in order to
maximize the quality of the
product or services they provide,
coutniuted onpqge 56 7
continuedfrompage 525
in the judicial process because Ms.
Lewinsky struck a deal with Mr. Starr
and voluntarily turned over the
records.
The Tattered Cover, in its case,
urged the court to apply the
compelling need standard. Wc
argued that the government did not
demonstrate a compelling need for
the information to make their case,
nor did authorities exhaust their
other alternatives in gathering
information. Only when there is
compelling need and there are no
other alternatives should First
Amendment guarantees be set aside.
continued on page570
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continuedfrompage 555

as well as45the reach of their
'market.'
In short, the court insisted on the
ability of California employers to
compete for employees nationwide
irrespective of the costs incurred by
non-California employers from
abrogation of their non-competition
agreements.

There are strong arguments for
enforcing contracts choosing the law
applicable to non-competition
agreements. First, such agreements
are likely to reflect the contracting
parties' mutual interests. Second,
enforcement allows firms to escape
inefficient restrictions on contracting,

particularly where states otherwise
would be able to reach far outside
their borders, as in Hunter.Third,
enforcing agreements notifies parties
what law will be applied to their
contract, and therefore how to draft
the contract, price its provisions and
behave in accordance with the
applicable law. Fourth, these
contracts allow firms to impose the
same rules with regard to all
employees, even if they live in states
with different rules on enforcement of
non-competes. This may be
significant where the fir must design
company-wide rules and
contracts relating to information
dissemination, incentives, and basic
structure of its employment

relationships. 46 For example, a firm
may want to make its compensation
contracts contingent on compliance

with the non-compete in order to
discipline potential abuse of
corporate information.
The problem with enforcing
contractual choice is that it can allow
an end-run around efficient state
regulation. if state regulation of noncompetes reduces externalities such as
the efficiency of free-flowing
information, it follows that these
externalities will impede efficient
contractual choice just as they do
efficient non-competes. 47

One way to accommodate
arguments for and against
enforcement is to enforce contractual
choice of law except where a state
whose law would apply in the
absence of a choice of law clause
specifically legislates against

enforcement of the non-compete.
This restriction has two components.
First, it limits the reach of state
restrictions on contractual choice. This
focuses attention on the terms of the
default choice-of-law rule. In contrast
to the current multi-factor test, this
rule should be designed to be as
precise and predictable as
possible. Predictability would
maximize the parties' ability to exit
from oppressive laws by avoiding
regulating states, and would let the
parties shape their conduct and
contract with reference to the
applicable law. 48 These
considerations would, for example,
usually preclude application of the

law of a raiding employer's state
where the firm is raiding employees of
an out-of-state firm, as in Hunter.49
Second, the applicable state should
be able to restrict contractual choice
only by explicit legislative policy. This
again reflects the need to
facilitate contracting with reference to
the applicable law. It also helps
ensure popular support for any
restrictions on contractual choice by
making the restriction salient and
thereby inviting active competition
among interest groups. 50 This is not
feasible where courts decide choice of
5
law disputes expost in specific cases. i
This approach contrasts with the
current emphasis on
"fundamental policy" and a state's
"interests," which make it uncertain
which states' regulation will be
applied to trump contractually
selected law. The vagueness of these
tests sometimes allows states to have
it both ways, applying their laws to
enforce contracts of local firms against
out-of-state firms, as well as to tromp
contracts of out-of-state firms in favor
of local firms.
Efficient enforcement of

contractual choice of law consistent
with the recommended rule may
follow from the combined influence
of several related contractual devices
and legal rules. First, since results like
that in Hunterare likely to be reached
only by state courts in states with selfserving policies regarding noncompetition agreements, the parties
may be able to minimize these results
through choice-of-forum or arbitration

clauses that choose more contractfriendly adjudicators or jurisdictions.
For example, in the Hunlersituation,

the parties might agree to have the
case tried in Maryland. Although the
employee may seek to avoid the effect
of this clause by suing in California, a
California state court may have some
incentive to avoid having to decide
the tricky choice-of-law issue by
enforcing the choice-of-forum
clause. 52 The Federal Arbitration Act
may ensure enforcement of the
arbitration clause if the transaction
53
involves interstate commerce.
Second, to the extent that courts do
not enforce ex antechoice of forum
clauses, the parties have significant
leeway to ensure enforcement of their
chosen law by choosing to litigate in a
hospitable forum. For example, the
employer can sue in the contractually
selected state or in federal court to
enforce the choice-of-law clause or to
get a declaratory judgment that the
contract is enforceable. Although
federal courts apply local state law in
diversity cases, 54 they may tend more
than state courts to enforce
contractual choice of law in marginal
cases because they lack state judges'
incentives to back the prerogatives of
the local legislature. 55 In fact, a
survey of approximately 20 years of
decisions under the Restatement
provisions quoted above showed that
federal courts were mpproximately
twice as likely to enforce contractual
choice as state courts. 6 As one might
expect, most cases involving
enforcement of contractual choice of
law have been decided in federal
court.

57

To be sure, the employee can play
the same game and sue in a nonenforcing court to invalidate the
agreement. Indeed, both games
played out in Hunter,with the
wronged employer suing and getting
a judgment in Maryland, and the
competing new employer suing in
California. 58 The former employer
was able to stay the California action
pending completion of the Maryland
action. 59 The California court noted
that it was not determining the full
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faith and credit effect of any
judgment Iunter might obtain in
Maryland, 60 Although the employer
will not always succeed in this game,
the prospect of competing judgments
may be enough to persuade courts to
enforce choice of forum clauses and
eliminate any uncertainty about the
forum.61
'Third, even if the parties cannot
control the fomm, they may be able to
structure their contracts to avoid
application of regulating states' laws,
or avoid contacts with those states that
might justify application of those
states' laws. In HunleC for example,
the raided employer could avoid
subjecting its own activities to
California law by not stationing
employees with non-competes in
California, instead working there
through independent contractors.
Although none of these
approaches helped I tunter avoid
application of California law to the
California firm that raided its
employees, Huntershould be seen as
an extreme case where Hunter was
specifically concerned about being
raided by the California firm. The
application of California law there
meant that the partics were at least
treated sy rmnetrically - that is,
Hunter could not hide behind
Maryland law while raiding the
California firm under Calilornia law.
Thus, the decision effectively
preserves the viability of California
law, which otherwise would have
been threatened by one-sided
application of the California
regulation. Moreover, the quote from
the opinion above makes clear that
the court was specifically concerned
about "virtual" or knowledge based
firms with no fixed location. 62 The
court held that under its rule "it is
plainly not sufficient simply to be
employed by a California-based
employer such as AGI, or to be
treated as a California employee for
tax and other legal purposes, if the
employee is to perform services
exclusively 'beyond the borders of
California.'"63
In sum, this discussion raises two
general points. First, the existence of
an externality or spillover problem
with state regulation is based on the
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same factors that give rise to
jurisdictional choice. Second,
jurisdictional choice supports
enforcement of contracts from an
interstate perspective even if these
contracts do not seem to be
enforceable from an intrastate
perspective.

III. PROTECTING
EMPLOYEES' PRIVACY
"Jhis Part discusses the issues
regarding privacy of employees'
information. As discussed in Part I,
above, the employers' need for this
information is a function of the
inherent characteristics of the firm namely, the team production
problem, which triggers a need for
monitoring. As discussed in subpart
A, this need for information may
collide with employees desire for
and expectation of privacy. As
discussed in subpart B, these
problems theoretically may be
resolved by contracts between
employers and employees, although
these contracts may not always be
enforced. Subpart C shows that, as
with privacy of employers'
information, contracting is a viable
solution from an interstate
perspective.

A. GENERAL POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
lployecs have an interest in

E

protecting against employers'
intrusions on their private space,
Conversely, employers have a
legitimate interest in monitoring
employees, including preventing
abuse of employers' confidential
information and detecting crimes and
other wrongs committed by
employees. Enforcing contracts
regarding these matters increases
social wealth by encouraging
efficient employment arrangements.
Arguments concerning the
employee's privacy draw on the
economic theories of privacy and
information costs. Protecting
employees' privacy increases
employers' information costs,
thereby making the employment
marker less efficient and increasing
agency costs. 64 This may both

reduce social wealth and redistribute
wealth from "good" to "bad"
employees. Amnong other effects, the
inability to monitor may decrease
employers' ability to protect against
employee abuse of trade secrets,
thereby increasing the firm's need to
rely on non-competition agreenents.
On the other hand, protecting
employees' privacy to some extent
may be efficient. Employees may
derive utility from protecting their
personal space. 6 5 This protection
may enable them to better realize
their prixate preferences, such as
sexual orientation, or to avoid
misinterpretation of isolated bits of
information, such as out of context
statements. 66 If legal protection is
inadequate, employees may have to
invest in self-protection, which
would force greater expenditures on
reputation than would be the case
under an efficient legal rule,6' Even if
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the particular basis for employee
utility cannot be identified, the test
arguably should be subjective rather
68
than objective.

B ENFORCING CONTRACTS:
INTRASTATE PERSPECTIVE
with non-competition

k

greements and protecting
against abuse of trade secrets,
enforcing contracts can lead to the
optimal rules for particular situations.
Employers arguably would not seek
excessively to invade employees'
privacy because they will have to pay
employees to succumb to this
surveillance. Employers seemingly
would have little interest in
generating irrelevant or inaccurate
information about employees. The
courts have, in fact, enforced
employer surveillance where it has a
69
business purpose.
An initial contracting issue
regarding employer surveillance
concerns the appropriate default
rule.70 In the consumer information
context, a default rule favoring
privacy may be appropriate because
the merchant arguably has a better
idea than the consumer of the value
of the information. 71 However, in the
employment context the default rule
arguably should favor surveillance
because the employee has a better
idea of the negative information that
the employer might discover. The
default rule, of course, would not be
expected to prefer unlimited
surveillance because this would
impose high costs on employees
without enough benefit for
employers to justify sufficient wage
adjustments to cover these costs. This
supports the general requirement of
surveillance being reasonably related
to the employer's business
72
purpose.
But it is not feasible to design a
default rule that adequately covers all
situations because such a rule would
have to be too narrow or too broad. A
default rule based on a legitimate
business purpose might cover all
employers and employees but is too
broad to provide adequate guidance
in specific situations. Thus, the
parties will need to rely on specific
contracts.

Nevertheless, there is significant
recent authority against enforcement

of contracts. Cramnerv. Consolidated
Freightways,Inc.7 3 held that a
collective bargaining agreement that
arguably allowed video surveillance
behind two-way bathroom mirrors
could not supersede what the court
deemed to be the mandatory
provisions of state privacy law. The
judge who wrote the en bane
decision expressed a concern in his
panel dissent about Orwellian
intrusions. 74 This makes little sense
assuming that the employees
consented to the intrusion in the
collective bargaining agreement, as a
dissenter to the en bane decision
argued.75 Moreover, the Orwellian
argument suggests the
implementation of a federal policy,
which is inappropriate in the context
of purportedly interpreting a state
restriction on intrusions. In any event,
this case indicates that, as with noncompetition agreements, employers
apparently cannot rely on contracts
with employees, at least viewed from
the intrastate
perspective.

C. ENFORCING CONTRACTS:
INTERSTATE PERSPECTIVE
W e interstate perspective on
employee privacy contracts
differs from that in the noncompetition setting because
employee privacy agreements are
more likely to be anchored in a
single state. The non-compete
context involves the competing
interests of states where raiding and
raided firms are located. With respect
to employee privacy, on the other
hand, the primary interests are focused
in a single state, where the employee
whose interests are at stake is located.
Thus, there are less likely to be
regulatory spillovers in this context. In
other words, the employers' ability to
select
jurisdictions in which they locate may
be enough to internalize
regulatory costs and benefits in
regulating jurisdictions. At the same
time, employers' ability to choose the
applicable jurisdiction is likely to be
more limited. Under the Restatement,
courts are unlikely to enforce the
contractual choice of a jurisdiction

other than where the invaded
employee works to trump the
"fundamental" regulatory policy of the
state of employment.
Despite these considerations,
employee privacy has a real interstate
dimension. Multi-state employers are
likely to want to choose a single
policy for monitoring employees.
The problem is even more serious for
"virtual" companies like those in
Hunter, where employees live and
work in several states and the
employers' privacy policies relate to,
for example, networked computers.
Although default choice of law rules
raise fewer problems in this context
than in the non-compete context,
choice-of-law clauses may be useful to
enable employers to avoid oppressive
states without
having to avoid hiring in those states.
Again, these clauses should be
enforceable unless the "default" state
specifically legislates against them.
Howeve; the Consolidated
Freightwayscase indicates that
contractual choice may not always be
enforceable. The court refused to
enforce the employer's effective
choice of federal labor law against a
supposed state mandatory privacy
rule.
As with non-competes, employers
may be able to enforce jurisdictional
choice by choosing the forum in
which they litigate. To be sure, courts
with strong pro-privacy policies may
be unwilling to enforce contractual
choice of forum. Bu an employer
may be able to choose expostto
litigate the enforceability of the
contract in a state in which it does
substantial business,

Y

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
aditional economic theories of the

firm intersect with modern
concerns about privacy. The firm is
about ensuring the free flow of
information, while privacy policies
attempt to intersect these flows. These
competing concerns generally should
be resolved by contracts. In some
cases state regulation is
appropriate. Jurisdictional choice in
our federal system serves to
discipline excessive state regulation.
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